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Abstract:
 
Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be cre-
dited with the concept of  objectivity – and, so, with language and thought
– it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here
examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is
unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of  the
thesis in 
 
Making It Explicit.
 
 I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order
to possess the concept of  objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the
practice of  interpersonal reasoning because possession of  the concept is
independently integral to the practice of  intrapersonal reasoning.
 
1.
 
Philosophers of language are much divided when it comes to the question
of  whether and in what sense, if  any, language is socially constituted.
Perhaps the most familiar version of the debate concerns which notion of
language – whether that of idiolect or sociolect – is fundamental for pur-
poses of reflection on meaning and understanding.
 
1
 
 Are the semantic pro-
perties of idiolects to be explained by reference to the semantic properties
of sociolects, or is it the other way around?
 
2
 
 Donald Davidson’s position
with regard to the role of the social in this context may, at first, therefore
seem somewhat paradoxical. Following Quine, Davidson has long cham-
pioned the notion of idiolect as fundamental for the theory of meaning.
At the same time, however, in numerous articles written over several
decades, he has defended the view that 
 
intersubjective
 
 
 
communication
 
 is a
metaphysically necessary condition of the existence of language and
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thought.
 
3
 
 The appearance of paradox is dispelled by Davidson’s well-
known denial that the notion of  sociolect plays any role when it comes
to explaining the phenomenon of successful communication between
speakers.
 
4
 
 For Davidson, successful communication is to be explained by
mutual awareness of meaning in the context of utterance, not by mutual
awareness of meaning in a common language. “There seems to me to be
no reason, in theory at least,” he writes, “why speakers who understand
each other ever need to speak, or to have spoken, as anyone else speaks,
much less as each other speaks” (1994/2005, p. 115).
 
5
 
 Language and
thought are social, on Davidson’s view, not because they require the
existence of intersubjectively recognized linguistic conventions or norms,
 
6
 
but rather because they metaphysically depend on linguistic interaction
between speakers for their existence. In what follows, I shall refer to this
view as the 
 
communication thesis.
 
Davidson starts from the idea that language and thought have an
objective, representational character, i.e., from the idea that there is a
potential contrast between what is said and what is so, between how
things are taken to be in judgment and how things really are. This idea is
sometimes made out in terms of the ‘transparency’ of belief  from the
first-person perspective. “It will be common knowledge,” Richard Moran
writes,
 
 . . . among anyone with the concept of  belief, that although one believes something 
 
as
 
 true,
the fact believed and the fact 
 
of
 
 one’s belief  are two different matters. From within the first-
person perspective I acknowledge the two questions as distinct in virtue of  acknowledging
that what my beliefs are directed upon is an independent world, and they may therefore fail
to conform to it. (Moran, 2001, pp. 61–62)
 
On this view, the (second-order) concepts of objective truth, error, and belief,
form what Christopher Peacocke calls a ‘local holism’: to possess any one
of the concepts in the trio is perforce to possess all three. The conceptual
skills that enable us to make sense of other agents through attribution of
mental states that stand in reason-giving relations to their actions are, at
the same time, skills that enable us to think of ourselves as each having a
certain subjective perspective on an objective, independent world.
While perhaps this much is widely accepted among philosophers of
mind, the conclusion of Davidson’s central argument for the communica-
tion thesis depends on two more controversial premises:
1) A creature that does not possess the concept of  objectivity cannot
be credited with either language or thought.
2) In order to possess the concept of  objectivity it is necessary for a
creature to be in linguistic communication with at least one other
creature.
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Combining (1) and (2), it follows that linguistic communication is a
necessary condition of the possibility of language and thought. (It also
follows that 
 
having language
 
 and 
 
having thought
 
 are ‘anatomic’ properties
of persons (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). A property 
 
F
 
 is anatomic, if  when-
ever it is the case that an object 
 
x
 
 has 
 
F
 
, then, necessarily, there exists
some different object 
 
y
 
 that also has 
 
F
 
. Examples of anatomic properties
include 
 
being a co-author
 
, 
 
being married
 
, and 
 
being in tune
 
. For Davidson,
if  one person has language and thought, then, necessarily, there is at
least one other person who also has language and thought.) It is in this
sense, one that notably makes no appeal to the notion of sociolect, that
language and thought are social in a philosophically profound sense for
Davidson.
Davidson is not the only prominent philosopher of language to defend
such a view. In Chapter 8 of 
 
Making It Explicit
 
, Robert Brandom puts
forward a much-elaborated version of Davidson’s argument for the com-
munication thesis.
 
7
 
 “Only communities, not individuals,” on Brandom’s
construal of its conclusion, “have original intentionality” (1994, p. 61).
(So expressed, the communication thesis is given an obvious Hegelian
flavor.) Perhaps to a greater extent than the other two main architectonic
ideas in 
 
Making It Explicit
 
 – the idea that meaning is ‘normative’ and
the idea that meaning is inferential role – the communication thesis is
burdened with the task of supporting the unique social-deontological
approach Brandom takes towards language in the book. “The 
 
via media
 
pursued here,” he writes in the preface, “eschews intentional or semantic
specifications of behavior but permits normative and therefore social
specifications of what is in fact linguistic behavior” (1994, p. xv).
Although I think that the very idea of such a deontological 
 
via media
 
 is
extremely problematic,
 
8
 
 the present point is that it is only issue of a pro-
missory note at the beginning of 
 
Making It Explicit
 
 to defend the com-
munication thesis in Chapter 8 that gives provisional license to pursuit of
that middle path in preceding chapters. There is thus much riding on the
cogency of the argument presented in Chapter 8, for without the buttress
provided by the communication thesis it is not clear how much of the
broad project undertaken in 
 
Making It Explicit
 
 is otherwise adequately
motivated.
The communication thesis is perhaps one of the better-known versions
of  the view that language and thought are social in a philosophically
profound sense. In this paper, I focus on the crucial second premise in
the Davidson-Brandom argument for the thesis, namely, that, in order to
possess the concept of objectivity, it is necessary for a creature to be in
linguistic communication with at least one other creature. I first explain
how Davidson’s deployment of the communication thesis can be viewed
as a response to a problem about the possibility of empirical content that
arises when an idea central to what McDowell (1994) calls ‘minimal
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empiricism’ is rejected. I then argue that there are two serious problems
with Davidson’s defense of the communication thesis, the latter of which
shows that there can be no cogent repudiation of minimal empiricism.
Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the communication
thesis in 
 
Making It Explicit.
 
 According to Brandom:
 
 . . . it is precisely the objectivity of conceptual norms, when properly understood, that leads
to the requirement that the practices in which such norms are implicit be 
 
social
 
 practices.
The objective representational dimension of conceptual content . . . turns out to depend on
the
 
 social 
 
articulation of the inferential practice of giving and asking for reasons. (1994, p. 54)
 
I argue, however, that grasping the distinction between appearance and
reality, between what is 
 
taken
 
 to be the case and what 
 
is
 
 the case, is inte-
gral to the first-person stance of the rational agent and, so, already part
of  being in a position to play the Sellarsian game of  giving and asking
for reasons. In order to have the concept of objectivity, is not necessary,
contrary to Brandom, to engage in the practice of interpersonal reason-
ing because having the concept is already and independently integral to
the practice of 
 
intra
 
personal reasoning.
 
2.
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to make a couple of preliminary remarks.
First, it is important to be clear that neither premise (1) nor (2) in the
argument for the communication thesis is intended as a 
 
psychological
 
claim about human cognitive ontogeny. Premise (2), for example, is not
intended as the claim that acquisition of the concept of objectivity (and
its cognates) is psychologically enabled by the ability to communicate
with others. Rather, it is intended as an 
 
a priori 
 
constitutive claim, a claim
about 
 
what it is
 
 to have the concept of objectivity. Indeed, it cannot be
intended as a psychological claim if  what is at issue is a supposed meta-
physically necessary condition of the existence of language and thought –
a ‘transcendental’ condition of their possibility as it were.
 
9
 
Second, the communication thesis neither implies nor is implied by social
externalism (or ‘social anti-individualism,’ as it is sometimes called).
Social externalists adhere to the view that in certain circumstances –
namely, those assumed to obtain in Tyler Burge’s well-known thought-
experiments – the meanings of words in a speaker’s idiolect and the con-
ceptual contents of her thoughts partly depend for their individuation on
facts about her social environment. The thesis does not imply social exter-
nalism because it is compatible with the Quinean idea that, in the context
of interpretation, facts about the meanings of a speaker’s words depend
solely on public facts about the use she as an individual makes of them.
 
10
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(For discussion, see Bilgrami, 1992, chap. 3.) Moving in the other direction,
the thesis is not implied by social externalism because social externalism
does not entail that interpersonal linguistic interaction is metaphysically
necessary for having either language or thought. Social externalism is a
thesis about the individuation or correct explication of certain representa-
tional contents. Unlike the communication thesis, it makes no 
 
a priori
 
claims about the general conditions of the possibility of representational
content.
 
11
 
 It does not claim, in particular, that “speaking a language
requires that there be an interpreter” (Davidson, 1992/2001a, p. 114). It is
thus potentially misleading when Davidson broadly characterizes social
externalism as maintaining that “the contents of our thoughts depend, in
one way or another, on interaction with other thinkers” (2001b, p. 2). Such
characterization covers over fundamental differences between the two views.
As Bjørn Ramberg observes, the view to which Davidson adheres “makes
the presence of thought contingent not on the presence of in-principle
interpretable patterns of events, but on actual interpretation” (2001, p. 228).
The third point is that it is important to distinguish this view, i.e. the
communication thesis, from Daniel Dennett’s influential and well-known
view that a creature is an intentional system just in case its behavior can
be usefully explained and predicted by attributing (appropriately related)
beliefs and desires to it, i.e., by taking up the “intentional stance” towards
it. This latter view is significantly weaker because, according to Dennett,
the patterns of behavior identified from the intentional stance are 
 
real
 
patterns, “really, objectively there to be noticed or overlooked” (1987,
p. 37).
 
12
 
 The relevant patterns are not, contrary to Brandom’s “phenome-
nalist” assimilation of Dennett’s view in 
 
Making It Explicit
 
 (pp. 55–62),
merely in the eye of the beholder; they are not dependent for their exist-
ence on their actually being detected by someone. (William Child, for
purposes of distinguishing the stronger view, refers to it as ‘constitutive
interpretationism’ (1994, p. 47). Dennett has stated in conversation that
he rejects constitutive interpretationism.) The difference between Den-
nett, on the one hand, and Davidson and Brandom, on the other, broadly
speaking, then, is the difference between saying that a creature has inten-
tional states only if  it is interpret
 
able
 
 as having them and saying that a
creature has intentional states only if  it is actually interpret
 
ed
 
 as having
them.
 
13
3.
 
In the phenomenon known as “joint attention” (or “joint awareness”)
two individuals attend to the same thing at the same time and, crucially,
 
both
 
 are aware that 
 
both
 
 are aware of this fact. Joint attention and the
kind of ostensive learning it enables are fundamental to the process of
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acquiring a first language (Tomasello, 1999, 2003). It is the triangle of
child, adult, and jointly attended circumstance that makes incipient forms
of intersubjective understanding possible. Michael Tomasello writes:
 
 . . . at around nine to twelve months of  age a new set of  behaviours begins to emerge
that . . . are triadic in the sense that they involve a coordination of  their interactions with
objects and people, resulting in a referential triangle of  child, adult, and the object or event
to which they share attention. Most often the term 
 
joint attention 
 
has been used to charac-
terize this whole complex of  social skills and interactions . . . Most prototypically, it
is at this age that infants for the first time begin to flexibly and reliably look where adults
are looking (gaze following), to engage with them in relatively extended bouts of  social
interaction mediated by an object (joint engagement), to use adults as social reference
points (social referencing), and to act on objects in the way adults are acting on them (imi-
tative learning). (1999, p. 62)
 
Joint attention, however, is also fundamental to full-blown communica-
tion by means of language. Successful communication between mature
speakers typically involves not only joint awareness of the world, in parti-
cular, the perceptible context in which communication takes place, but also
joint awareness of the 
 
meaning
 
 of  communicative partners’ utterances
(Campbell, 2002, chap. 8; Peacocke, 2005). It is this sort of mature, tri-
angular communicative situation that is of primary interest to Davidson.
I shall follow him, below, in referring to the joint attention situation in
which two competent speakers communicate with one another by know-
ingly correlating their respective linguistic responses to a certain percept-
ible state of affairs as 
 
triangulation
 
.
Now there is nothing contentious about the claim that what one might
call ‘proto-triangulation’ is psychologically necessary when it comes to first-
language acquisition. (Unlike Davidson’s triangulation, proto-triangulation
would not require that 
 
both
 
 individuals already have full-blown language
and so could potentially explain how one of them could be brought to
have it.) Indeed, from a psychological standpoint, it is not clear how else
the trick could be pulled off. For precisely this reason, much empirical
research has been done on how children learn language from adults in
‘joint attention triangles.’ (For reviews, see Malle 
 
et al.
 
, 2001 and Eilan
 
et al
 
., 2005.) Davidson, however, makes a far more radical claim than that
some form of proto- or incipient triangulation is psychologically neces-
sary for first-language acquisition. The kind of intersubjective, com-
municative interaction that is involved in mature triangulation, he
maintains, is an 
 
a priori
 
, metaphysically necessary condition of  the
possibility of the existence of language and thought. In “The Emergence
of Thought,” he writes:
 
 . . . the triangle . . . is essential to the existence . . . of thought. For without the triangle, there
are two aspects of  thought for which we cannot account. These two aspects are: the
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objectivity of  thought, and the empirical contents of  thoughts about the external world.
(Davidson, 1997/2001a, p. 129)
 
For Davidson, triangulation accounts for both aspects at the same time.
The successful correlation of linguistic responses it enables accounts for
their empirical content, while the possibility of failure of correlation of
linguistic responses accounts for, or rather makes ‘conceptual space’ for,
application of the concept of objectivity. But why does Davidson think
that triangulation plays any such enabling role? What problem about
accounting for the two aspects of  thought mentioned in the passage
motivates Davidson’s appeal to triangulation?
 
4.
 
The problem in Davidson’s writings of accounting for the two aspects of
thought – its objectivity and its empirical contentfulness – can be viewed
as a consequence of his rejection of what John McDowell (1994) calls
‘minimal empiricism.’ Minimal empiricism combines two main ideas: The
first idea is that the empirical contentfulness of language and thought
requires for its intelligibility that perceptual belief  be conceived as 
 
ration-
ally
 
 
 
responsible
 
 to the perceptible facts. Perceptual beliefs must be con-
ceived as answerable to the world for their truth if  it is to be intelligible
how they and the non-perceptual beliefs they justify can be bearers of
empirical content.
 
14
 
The second idea is that perceptual belief  requires for its intelligibility
that an individual be conceived as
 
 rationally responsive
 
 to the perceptible
facts to which her perceptual beliefs are rationally responsible.
 
15
 
 (For sub-
stantial articulation and defense of this view, see Brewer, 1999.) Accord-
ing to minimal empiricism, the fact that an individual’s perceptual belief,
say, that the leaves on a certain maple tree are red, has a certain empirical
content is to be connected with her abilities perceptually to assess the
rational credentials of that belief  in view of what is perceptibly the case.
In this example, it is to be connected with her ability to 
 
perceive
 
 whether
or not the leaves are red. The second idea thus qualifies the first idea by
tethering rational responsibility – i.e., 
 
answerability
 
 to the facts – to
rational responsiveness – i.e., the ability to 
 
answer
 
 in view of the facts.
McDowell puts the two ideas together as follows:
 
 . . . thinking that aims at judgment, or at the fixation of belief, is answerable to the world for
whether or not it is correctly executed. And now a small step away from that abstract formu-
lation takes us to a minimal, and one might think indisputable, empiricism: in the sorts of
case that must come first for reflection on the very idea of directedness at the world, the
world’s verdict, to which thinking must be answerable if  it is to be thinking at all, is delivered
by way of a pronouncement from . . . ‘the tribunal of experience’. (1996, pp. 231–32)
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The passage combines the first idea with the second in binding the notion
of empirical contentfulness to the notion of perceptual experience as pro-
viding a ‘tribunal’ for empirical thinking and, thereby, to the notion of
rational responsiveness. For McDowell, perceptual experience is a mode
of rational responsiveness to the facts to which one’s perceptual beliefs
are rationally responsible. Minimal empiricism, in coupling the two ideas,
denies that there can be such a thing as rational responsibility without
rational responsiveness.
 
16
Davidson rejects the second idea comprised by minimal empiricism. He
denies that perception can intelligibly serve as a court of appeals for
empirical belief, that, as McDowell puts it, “When we trace the ground
for an empirical judgement, the last step takes us to experiences” (1994,
p. 10). The problem, according to Davidson, is that the relation in which
perception stands to belief  is not logical or justificatory, “since sensations
are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes” (1983/2001a, p. 143).
Rather, the relation is causal: “Sensations cause some beliefs and in this
sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of
a belief  does not show how or why the belief  is justified” (ibid.). However,
if  its perceptual ancestry does not provide the justification of a belief,
then what does? Without an answer to this question, we lose our purchase
on the idea of  belief  as a mental state whose content depends on the
particular way it is rationally responsible to the world for its truth.17
The problem with looking to perception for justification, as Davidson
sees it, comes out very clearly in the following passage from “Empirical
Content”:
It should be obvious that no appeal to perception can clear up the question [of ] what
constitutes a person’s ultimate source of  evidence. For if  we take perception to consist in
a sensation caused by an event in the world (or in the body of  the perceiver), the fact of
causality cannot be given apart from the sensation, and the sensation cannot serve as
evidence unless it causes a belief. But how does one know that the belief  was caused by a
sensation? Only further beliefs can help.
There is, then, good reason to conclude that there is no clear meaning to the idea of
comparing our beliefs with reality or confronting our hypotheses with observations. (1982/
2001a, p. 164)
But, if  there is no clear meaning to the idea of perceptually comparing
our beliefs with reality or confronting hypotheses with observations – as
required by minimal empiricism – then it is not obvious how there can be
clear meaning to the idea that empirical language and thought are ration-
ally responsible to how things are in the world. How can there be rational
responsibility and, so, empirical contentfulness, without rational responsive-
ness? As McDowell expresses the worry here, “What we wanted to
conceive as exercises of concepts threaten to degenerate into moves in a
self-contained game” (1994, p. 5).
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5.
Davidson’s theory of triangulation is intended to assuage precisely this
worry. It is intended as an answer to the question: How can there be
rational responsibility and, so, empirical contentfulness, without rational
responsiveness? His answer starts with the idea that while the cause of a
response (a putative belief  or utterance), does not justify the response, it
does, at least in the epistemically most basic cases, fix its empirical con-
tent. But how given Davidson’s repudiation of the second idea comprised
by minimal empiricism is it determined what in the world is the cause of
a response? If, from the first-person point of view, “the fact of causality
cannot be given apart from the sensation, and the sensation cannot serve
as evidence unless it causes a belief,” then how is it possible to key a
response to an event or type of event in the world?
It is Davidson’s suggestion that no solution to the problem is forthcoming
if we focus on the causal relation between the responses of a single creature
and the stimuli that cause them. In “Conditions of Thought,” he writes:
If  we consider a single creature by itself, its responses, no matter how complex, cannot
show that it is reacting to, or thinking about, events at a certain distance away rather than,
say, on its skin.
The problem is not, I should stress, one of  verifying what objects or events a creature is
responding to; the problem is that without a second creature interacting with the first,
there can be no answer to the question. And if  there can be no answer to the question what
a creature, means, wants, believes or intends, it makes no sense to hold that the creature
has thoughts. (Davidson, 1989, p. 198)18
It seems clear that the problem Davidson adumbrates here is a version of
the so-called “distality problem” faced by causal theories of meaning and
mental content (Fodor, 1990, pp. 57–60). This is the problem that a
response reliably keyed to a certain event-type in a causal chain of
covarying event-types is necessarily keyed to every event-type in that
chain. If  response-type R is keyed to distal event-type F (the presence of
a rabbit) and, if  F causally covaries with proximal event-type G (a certain
pattern of retinal stimulation), then R is also keyed to G. Without a solu-
tion to the distality problem, there is no saying whether the event-type to
which a response-type is reliably keyed is located outside a creature, or on
its sensory periphery, or somewhere further in. (For discussion, see Jacob,
1997, pp. 100–104.)
The putative problem, it is important to emphasize, is not epistemo-
logical. It is not that it is merely impossible for us to know which event-
type is the relevant environmental cause of a creature’s responses, and so
what its responses mean. Rather, the problem is ontological: it concerns
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whether there is such a thing as the relevant environmental cause. In this
respect, there is an analogy – more than once noted by Davidson himself
– with Saul Kripke’s (1982) skeptical interpretation of the putative rule-
following paradox.19
This is where triangulation enters the picture. It is not the observer who
perceptually judges that p who keys her response to an event in the world,
rather but another person, an interpreter, with whom she is in communica-
tion. Davidson’s approach is premised on the idea that it is possible to, so
to speak, divide the perceptual labor that remains undivided in minimal
empiricism. The task of responding to the perceptible facts is delegated to
the observer, while the task of assessing the correctness of her response in
light of those facts is delegated to the interpreter. The interpreter, in cor-
relating the observer’s linguistic response to a perceptible event in the
world with her own response, fixes the empirical content of  the observer’s
response. At the same time, the possibility of failure of correlation of
responses accounts for, or rather makes ‘conceptual space’ for, applica-
tion of  the concept of  objectivity. What appears from the first-person
perspective as the distinction between what is said and what is so, between
what is taken to be the case and what is the case, is explained in terms of
what conceptually appears from the interpreter’s perspective as the poten-
tial conflict between the observer’s response and her own. (For example,
the observer reports that a duck is visible when the interpreter spies only
a decoy.) Interpretation, however, is a two-way street: whether a party
plays the role of interpreter or observer is relative to point of view.
Davidson thus repudiates the second idea comprised by minimal
empiricism, the idea that when we trace the ground for an observer’s
perceptual belief, the last step takes us to observer’s own experiences.
According to Davidson’s “non-individualist” approach, justification or
external constraint, so to speak, lies on an axis orthogonal to the causal
line between the facts and the perceptual beliefs they elicit. Whether an
observer’s perceptual belief  is justified is something that can only be
discerned from sideways on, from the point of  view of  the interpreter.
It is in this sense that Davidson’s approach is premised on the possibility
of dividing the perceptual labor that remains undivided in minimal
empiricism.
6.
Ignoring the details, there are two main problems with Davidson’s account
of how there can be rational responsibility without rational responsiveness.
The first is that communication cannot be a necessary condition of the
existence of empirically contentful language and thought because com-
munication presupposes the existence of empirically contentful language
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and thought. Successful communication about a jointly attended state of
affairs p, one might object, presupposes not only joint awareness of the
world, but also joint awareness of meaning. So it cannot be communica-
tive success that makes such mutual knowledge first possible. Communic-
ative success presupposes that there are facts about what communicative
partners mean by their respective words (in the contexts in which they are
uttered) and, so, cannot bring those facts into existence.
The difficulty with this first blush objection, however, is its talk of
presupposition. Communicative success, one might argue, does not pre-
suppose joint awareness of the meaning of an utterance, it is that joint
awareness: I utter a sentence that I understand in context to mean p and
you understand in context that I have said that p. As Peacocke writes,
“The utterer aims to bring about a state of joint awareness whose content
involves the meaning, or, better, the intentional content of the utterance
itself” (2005, p. 315). I take it that this is something Davidson himself
would want to say.
The problem, however, now comes back with full vigor. For, in attempt-
ing to explain what it is for one speaker to communicate with another,
we have made reference to a complex (presumably implicit) linguistic
intention to bring about a state of joint awareness whose content involves
the meaning of  an utterance. It is hard to see that it is possible make sense
of the phenomenon of successful communication without appeal to such
complex linguistic intentions. But, if  that is so, then communication can-
not be a conceptually necessary condition of the existence of language and
thought because, in the sense just explained, communication presupposes
the existence of language and thought.
Indeed, reflection on the broader phenomenon of joint attention impli-
cates the very notions whose possibility Davidson had intended to explain
by appeal to the phenomenon. Consider Peacocke’s (2005) account of full
joint attention by agents x and y to a state of affairs s:
(a) x and y are attending to s;
(b) x and y are each aware that their attention in (a) has mutual
open-ended perceptual availability; and
(c) x and y are each aware that this whole complex state of  awareness
(a)–(c) exists.20
Here “mutual open-ended perceptual availability” obtains, when,
according to Peacocke, “Each perceives that the other perceives that
s obtains; and if  either is occurrently aware that the other is aware that
he is aware . . . [the ellipsis indicates an open-ended number of possible
iterations] that s obtains, then the state of  affairs of  his being so
occurrently aware is available to the other’s occurrent awareness”
(2005, p. 302).
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Now, even if one would wish to qualify Peacocke’s elegant account, what
it makes clear is that full joint attention, including the full joint awareness
of meaning involved in successful communication, is possible only if  each
participant is capable of forming higher-order beliefs about its own mental
states and those of the other. But, if  that is so, then triangulation cannot
be a conceptually necessary condition of the existence of thought because,
in the sense just explained, it presupposes the existence of thought.
7.
The second problem with Davidson’s answer to the question “How can
there be rational responsibility and, so, empirical contentfulness, without
rational responsiveness?” can be brought out by reflecting on the inter-
preter’s supposed role in the context of  triangulation. According to
Davidson in “Empirical Content”:
It is not the speaker who must perform the impossible feat of  comparing his belief  with
reality; it is the interpreter who must take into account the causal interaction between
world and speaker in order to find out what the speaker means, and hence what he believes.
Each speaker can do no better than make his system of  beliefs coherent, adjusting the
system as rationally as he can as new beliefs are thrust on him. (1982/2001a, p. 174)
But how, one might ask, does the interpreter perform the feat – impossible
for the observer – of comparing the observer’s belief  (or putative utter-
ance expressive of belief) with reality? From the first-person perspective,
the interpreter is in no better position than the observer when it comes to
keying her own beliefs to their worldly causes. In particular, she is in no
better position than the observer when it comes to determining the causes
of her own beliefs about what the observer’s utterances mean, i.e., the
causes of her own beliefs about the causes of the observer’s utterances. If,
in general, from the first-person perspective, it is impossible, as Davidson
says, to compare one’s own beliefs with reality, then it is impossible for
the interpreter to compare her own beliefs about what is causing the
observer’s utterances with reality. The problem is that an interpreter is
just an observer of another observer, and an observer, on Davidson’s
‘non-individualist’ theory of perception, is not rationally responsive to
the facts to which her beliefs are rationally responsible.
Here is another way of  making the point. For purposes of  argument,
let us say that instead of  beliefs, an observer considered by herself, i.e.,
in notional isolation, has non-intentional schmeliefs.21 Now, my response
to Davidson is that if, as he centrally maintains, it is impossible for a
putative observer to identify the causes or assess the correctness of the
schmeliefs she forms, indeed, if  the question of correctness cannot even
arise for her schmeliefs, then bringing in another speaker can make no
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improvement on her predicament. In particular, it cannot transform
her schmeliefs into beliefs. For, in the scenario imagined here, other
people and, in particular, their sayings and doings, are just additional
causes of schmeliefs. The answer to the question “How can there be
rational responsibility and, so, empirical contentfulness, without rational
responsiveness?” is that there can’t be.
If we step back now, the preceding discussion has, I think, enabled us to
make the following general observation: An objective check on empirical
thinking cannot first ‘emerge’ out of communicative interaction because
communicative interaction – as opposed to mere sounding-off and gesticul-
ating – requires that one be rationally responsive in perception to the facts to
which one’s interlocutors’ (and one’s own) empirical judgments are ration-
ally responsible. In other words, in communicating about a shared environ-
ment, an individual A’s empirical judgments can intelligibly serve as a
source of rational constraint on another individual B’s empirical thinking
only provided that B herself  is able perceptually to assess the correctness
of A’s empirical judgments. But, if this is right, then, in general, other indi-
viduals’ empirical judgments cannot be the source of rational constraint
on B’s empirical thinking. Rather, the fundamental source of rational
constraint on B’s empirical thinking, as McDowell rightly insists, is her
own rational responsiveness to the world. If  other individuals’ judgments
are to be a source of rational constraint on B’s thinking – as they surely
often are – then B must already be in rational (and not merely causal)
contact with the world to which those judgments are rationally responsible.
To deny this, I would suggest, is to cling to the idea that intersubjective
interaction is a magic ingredient that somehow turns what Simon
Blackburn refers to as a ‘wooden’ picture of language into a ‘full’ one.
According to the wooden picture, “the only fact of the matter is that in
certain situations people use words, perhaps with various feelings like
‘that fits’, and so on. . . . But just because of this, it seems to make no
room for the idea that in using their words they are expressing judg-
ments” (1981, p. 183). The problem with the idea that intersubjective
interaction can somehow turn a wooden picture of language into a full
one, as Blackburn duly notes, is that “a lot of wooden persons with pro-
pensities to make noises is just more of whatever one of them is.”22
A related point to be made in ending this section concerns the claim
that it is the possibility of  disagreement in responses in the context of
triangulation that creates ‘conceptual space’ for the application of the
concept of error and, so, for rational constraint on perceptual judgment.23
The problem with this claim is that mere failure of expected correlation of
responses is not indicative of error unless the responses are tokens of a
response-type with a certain intentional content. Mere deviation in
‘wooden,’ non-intentionally characterized reactions, after all, would not
indicate more than that there are different propensities to make noises
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at work. But, then, the criterion of error is clearly not failure of correla-
tion in intersubjective responses, but rather straightforward failure of
correlation between an individual tokening of a response-type and the
event-type it represents. So the presence of a second creature with which
it is possible to triangulate seems irrelevant. (For a similar objection, see
Bridges, forthcoming.)
8.
According to Brandom, only on McDowell’s ‘individualist’ assumption
that the one whose judgment is justified must be the same one who can
appeal to the external constraint in justifying it is it correct to conclude
that “When we trace the ground for an empirical judgment, the last step
takes us to experiences” (Brandom, 1998, pp. 373–374). In attempting to
deflect the charge of individualism Brandom brings against minimal
empiricism,24 McDowell writes: “A rational animal could not have acquired
the conceptual capacities in whose possession its rationality consists
except by being initiated into a social practice. But as I see things, the
capacities transform their possessor into an individual who can achieve
standings in the space of entitlements by her own efforts” (McDowell,
2002, pp. 104–105). However, it was precisely the idea that an individual
can achieve such standings by her own efforts, the second idea comprised
by minimal empiricism, that invited Brandom’s charge of individualism.
What the foregoing discussion has shown is that the charge of individualism,
in the sense in which Brandom is using the term, is one to which McDowell
should plead guilty. The individualist orientation of minimal empiricism
is a feature, not a bug. (What is more, it is a feature has the merit of being
defensible apart from McDowell’s controversial characterization of expe-
rience in Mind and World as “an actualization of conceptual capacities in
sensory consciousness itself.”) Indeed, I have suggested that, if  successful
communication is in fact possible, then there can be no cogent repudia-
tion of the second idea comprised by minimal empiricism. This becomes
only clearer when we turn to examine Brandom’s own defense of the com-
munication thesis in Making It Explicit.
9.
In Chapter 8 of Making It Explicit, Brandom attempts to show that the
objective, representational character of language and thought can only be
explained in terms of the social or communicative dimension of linguistic
practice. This, of course, is the crucial second premise in the argument for
the communication thesis. According to Brandom, the representational
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dimension of propositional content arises out of the difference in perspec-
tive between producers and consumers of claims in what Wilfrid Sellars
called “the game of giving and asking for reasons.” Brandom explains
this difference in terms of an interpretation of the distinction between de
dicto and de re attributions of beliefs. An attribution in the de dicto style,
according to Brandom, specifies the content of the attributed belief  from
the perspective of the target of  attribution, the one who makes a claim,
who produces a reason. It specifies the content in a way that the target
herself  would be prepared to acknowledge. (Tiny Tim believes that Santa
Claus is kissing his mother <attributee’s perspective>.) Hence this style of
attribution is that appropriate to psychological explanation. An attribu-
tion in the de re style, by contrast, specifies the content from the perspec-
tive of the one who attributes the belief, who assesses the claim, who
consumes the reason. (Tiny Tim believes of his father that he is kissing his
mother <attributer’s perspective>.)
What follows from the assertion of a claim, from the expression of a
belief, clearly depends upon what other claims or beliefs serve as collat-
eral premises in the inference. In ascertaining what follows from a claim,
a speaker or ‘deontic scorekeeper,’ to use Brandom’s vocabulary, has a
choice to make: she can either assess its consequences from her own
doxastic perspective or from that of the speaker to whom the claim is
attributed. In the de dicto mode of attribution, she assesses the claim’s
consequences against the backdrop of claims that she attributes to the
other speaker. In the de re mode of attribution, by contrast, she assesses
the claim’s consequences against the backdrop of claims that she herself
would endorse or acknowledge as correct.25
De dicto and de re attributions thus “specify the single conceptual
content of a single belief  in two different ways, from two different per-
spectives, in two different contexts of auxiliary commitments” (Brandom,
2002, p. 102). If  Mary believes (de dicto) that the mysterious stranger stole
the silver candlesticks and, if  the mysterious stranger unbeknownst to
Mary is none other than Detective Shade in disguise, then Mary believes
(de re) of Detective Shade that he stole the silver candlesticks. If, unlike
Mary, I know that the mysterious stranger is none other than Detective
Shade, then, unlike Mary, I also know that she believes of Detective
Shade that he stole the silver candlesticks, that she is unwittingly commit-
ted to the truth of that claim. This example illustrates how the inferential
significance of a claim varies with doxastic perspective.
10.
Brandom’s leading idea in this context is that what appears from the first-
person perspective as the distinction or potential gap between what is said
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and what is so, between what is taken to be the case and what is the case,
is to be explained in terms of what appears from the third-person perspec-
tive as the distinction between a speaker’s merely attributing commitment
to a claim to another speaker and actually endorsing or undertaking
commitment to that claim herself. “From the point of  view of  each
scorekeeper, there is for every other interlocutor a distinction between
what commitments that individual acknowledges and what that indi-
vidual is really committed to . . . But how this line is drawn in particular
varies from scorekeeper to scorekeeper” (1994, p. 597). Hence, on Brandom’s
account, the possibility of error, returning to the first-person perspective,
is grasped as the possibility of  withholding endorsement of  a claim
that one attributes to another speaker.26 It follows that “there is no
pattern of [linguistic] moves a single individual might make that would
confer propositional contents with objective truth conditions on her
utterances” (1994, p. 158), since it is only in the social context of the game
of giving and asking for reasons that the concept of  error and, so, the
distinction between what is subjectively taken to be so and what objec-
tively is so, finds application. This is Brandom’s case for the crucial
second premise in the argument for the communication thesis.
11.
The most obvious problem with Brandom’s case for the second premise
is that he provides no reason to think that the objective-subjective distinc-
tion can only be explained in intersubjective terms, i.e. in terms of attribu-
tions of beliefs to other speakers. That is, he does not show that linguistic
communication is actually a necessary condition of grasping that distinc-
tion. Indeed, the distinction seems clearly to have (at least) two familiar and
fundamental intrasubjective applications. Consider, first, self-knowledge
about one’s past beliefs. Assume that I once believed (de dicto) that a certain
mysterious stranger stole a pair of silver candlesticks. Also assume that I
now not only know that the claim I made was false, but that the mysteri-
ous stranger was none other than Detective Shade in disguise. It follows
that I now know that I once believed (de re) of Detective Shade that he
stole the silver candlesticks. The dictum to which I was then committed
and, so, retrospectively attribute to my past self, is one that I now no
longer endorse by virtue of beliefs I have since acquired about the res in
question, i.e., Detective Shade.
Another intrasubjective application of the objective-subjective distinc-
tion is familiar from everyday reasoning and hypothesis mongering.
Suppose I am in the library and think the thought that Behemoth can wait
for his walk until I have finished working here. In mentally testing this
hypothesis, I reflect on past instances in which I kept the dog waiting at
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home for his walk and recall unpleasant counterexamples on the carpet
by the door. Recognizing my thought as the product of wishful thinking
– and, so, in Brandom’s terms, withholding endorsement from it – I hurry
home.
Brandom provides no reason to suppose that either familiar intra-
subjective application of the distinction between attributing or countenanc-
ing a claim and actually endorsing it is derived from its intersubjective use.
But in order to motivate the crucial second premise in the communication
thesis, he needs to show that such intrasubjective applications are in fact
parasitic on their intersubjective applications. That is, he needs to block
the availability of such a ‘naïve’ response as that made here.
12.
Part of what it means to say that thought has an objective, representa-
tional character, that thought is as it were transparent to the world, is that
when one addresses oneself  to the first-person, present-tense question
“Do I believe that p?” the deliberation in which one engages involves the
same sorts of considerations as would be involved in addressing oneself  to
the corresponding question about the world, i.e., “Is it the case that p?”
Knowing one’s own mind in the case of one’s beliefs requires that one be
able to make up one’s mind and, in order to make up one’s mind, one
appeals, as Moran (2001) puts it, to “one’s sense of the best reasons.”27
But, in appealing to one’s sense of the best reasons, one appeals not to the
psychological fact that one believes that p, but rather to the putative fact
that p itself, a fact whose obtaining one thinks of as independent of one’s
belief. One would not be rational were one to approach the question of
what one believes from the third-person, attributional perspective of the
intentional interpreter, of one engaged in psychological explanation. (“I
may not know what I think until I see what I say,” E. M. Forster once
quipped, but my relation to what I say and, so, to what I think is not
that of a detached observer.) From the first-person perspective, one asks
of oneself  not the attributional question “What do I believe?,” but the
deliberative question “What am I to believe?”
“Any representational state,” Moran writes, has “a dual aspect, one
under which it is treated as transparent to the world in a certain way,
another under which it makes a contribution to the behavior of the agent.
Naturally, these different interests in belief  are not restricted to the first-
and third-person uses, respectively” (2001, p. 130). The point I wish to
make now, in closing, is that recognition of the dual aspect of belief  – of
its objective side facing the world and its subjective side facing the agent
– is in fact integral to the first-person stance, to the reflective conscious-
ness of  a rational agent. In what follows, I argue that the fact that the
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second, subjective aspect of belief  is not and, for a rational agent, cannot
be restricted to its third-person use obviates Brandom’s approach to the
problem of objectivity.
It is a familiar observation that the presumption of rationality (or the
‘principle of charity’ as it is sometimes called) is a constitutive part of the
practice of engaging in third-person psychological explanation. Indeed, as
Davidson and Dennett both emphasize, the presumption that a person is
by and large rational and the presumption that she has identifiable pro-
positional attitudes by appeal to which it is possible to explain her actions
are one and the same. An intentional interpreter attempts to make rational
sense of the agent’s actions, and when the agent’s actions make no rational
sense, when they cease to be intelligible qua actions, they cannot straight-
forwardly be interpreted in intentional terms.28
Now, as I have already mentioned, one would not be rational were one
to approach the question of what one believes from the third-person,
attributional perspective of the intentional interpreter. A rational agent’s
belief, Moran writes:
is not for him a psychological datum that could even in principle justify his behavior purely
in its role as a psychological state. . . . On the other hand, a rationalizing interpreter will
take that behavior to be rationalized by the belief, whether it is true or false. The inter-
preter can afford to treat the belief  as a psychological datum and go on from there to use
it in a rationalizing explanation. The agent himself  does not have this option, and . . . he
would not be rational if  he did. And rationalizing interpretation, of  all things, must seek to
preserve the assumption of  the subject’s rationality. So the interpreter’s stance and its suc-
cess presuppose the stance of  the reasoning agent; and further, they presuppose that belief
is treated differently from within the two stances. (2001, p. 129)
The final point I wish to make now is that the interpreter’s presumption
of rationality also comprises the presumption that the reasoning agent, in
critical reflection, recognizes that her beliefs are rationally responsible to
an independent world for their truth, and so may fail to conform to it.
Moran writes that “Beliefs ‘aim at truth’ and do not enter into . . . reasoning
in a way that brackets the question of their truth” (2001, p. 130). While it
is no doubt right that it is what is believed, the putative fact that p, and
not one’s belief that p that plays a role in first-person reasoning, a rational
agent nonetheless recognizes that the outcome of  her reasoning is some-
thing that may fail in particular cases to conform with the world. Moran
makes much of the fact that, from the first-person perspective, a question
of the form “Do I believe there will be a third world war?” and a question
of the form “Will there be a third world war?” are equivalent in the delib-
erative demands they respectively make.29 In both cases, one looks to the
world, to the same outward circumstances, for an answer. But one would
not be rational were one to fail to recognize a distinction between the two
kinds of  questions and their answers, that is, between justification by
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one’s own lights and truth. A rational agent recognizes – if  not explicitly
in her reasoning – that though the question “Do I believe that p?” and the
question “Is it the case that p?” have, for her, the same assertibility condi-
tions, they have different truth conditions. (Hence, she recognizes that her
capacity correctly to answer a question of the form “Is it the case that p?”
is unreliable in a way that her capacity to answer a question of the form
“Do I believe that p?” is not.) If  this is right, then the interpreter’s pre-
sumption of rationality comprises the presumption that the reasoning
agent recognizes the subjective aspect of belief  in her deliberations. The
interpreter’s third-person stance and its success presuppose that the
distinction between merely believing that p and its really being the case
that p is a distinction made from within the first-person stance of  the
reasoning agent. Contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept
of objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the practice of interpersonal
reasoning because possession of the concept is independently integral to
the practice of intrapersonal reasoning.30
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NOTES
1  Broadly speaking, the notion of  idiolect is that of  language as spoken by an indi-
vidual speaker. As Richard Heck (forthcoming A) writes: “An idiolect . . . belongs to a single
individual, in the sense that one’s idiolect reflects one’s own linguistic capabilities
and, in this sense, is fully determined by facts about oneself.” The notion of  sociolect, by
contrast, is that of  language as historically common to a group of  speakers. Examples
include English, Russian, and Turkish. In between these two main competing notions of
language there is presumably room for a variety of  notions of  shared language with a
lower-profile than that of  sociolect, e.g. that of  a regional dialect or a lingo used in a
corporation or club. Hence, it is possible for one to be committed to the primacy of  some
notion of  shared language whose spatial, temporal, and demographic boundaries are more
precisely specifiable than that of  sociolect. Thanks to Richard Heck for helpful discussion
of this point.
2  This version of  the debate, I should note, presumes the existence of  both idiolects and
sociolects qua objects of  philosophical inquiry. For skepticism about the existence of  soci-
olects, see Chomsky, 2000. For views that attribute theoretical primacy to the notion of
sociolect, see Dummett, 1978, 1991, 1993, and Wiggins, 1997.
3  Many of  Davidson’s articles written in defense of  this view have been collected in
Davidson, 2001a. Page references for the following papers will be to that volume: “Empirical
Content” (1982), “A Coherence Theory of  Truth and Knowledge” (1983), “Epistemology
Externalized” (1990), “Three Varieties of  Knowledge” (1991), “The Second Person”
(1992), and “The Emergence of  Thought” (1997).
4  See “A Nice Derangement of  Epitaphs” (1986) and “The Social Aspect of  Language”
(1994), recently reprinted in Davidson, 2005.
5  For recent defense of  the view that the notion of  common language does not play a
role in explaining communicative success, see Heck forthcoming A.
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6  Indeed, Davidson denies that there are any semantic norms. See Bilgrami, 1992;
Davidson, 1993, 1994/2005; and Wikforss, 1999.
7  According to Brandom, Davidson only provides the form of  the argument. “Turning
it into an actual argument,” a central undertaking in Making It Explicit, “requires filling
in various notions of  content, of  objective representational correctness of  content, of  prac-
tical acknowledgement of  the significance of  the assessments of  correctness of  content, and
so on” (Brandom, 1994, p. 153).
8  It is the idea of  using a deontological vocabulary of  commitments and entitlements to
classify linguistic behavior under what (on pain of  explanatory circularity) is supposed to
be non-intentional description, in particular, that I think is problematic. The reason is that
it is only qua rational agent – a being with beliefs, desires, and other intentional attitudes –
that a person has commitments and entitlements. Indeed, it is only under intentional
description that what a person does can intelligibly be classified either as in keeping with
or in violation of  a commitment and, so, as correct or incorrect. “[M]aking a mistake,” as
Davidson writes, “must be doing something with the intention of  achieving a result that is
not forthcoming” (1980, p. 46, my emphasis). Similarly, Kant’s point in identifying the
intentional or rational, as opposed to causal, order with “the realm of freedom” is that it
is only qua rational agent that a person is intelligibly subject to norms. If  this is right, if
our capacity for normative understanding gets its grip on linguistic behavior only under
intentional description, then there simply is no deontological via media between employ-
ment of  a purely “physicalistic or other naturalistic vocabulary” and employment of  an
“intentional vocabulary with semantic locutions” to provide a theoretical characterization
of the relation between meaning and use. At any rate, it is hard to see in the first place how
‘pragmatic’ talk of  attributing commitments and entitlements to claims – or of  treating or
taking a speaker to be committed or entitled to a claim – could conceivably be classified as
non-intentional.
9  Jason Bridges (forthcoming) acknowledges the Kantian flavor of  Davidson’s argument
in calling its conclusion ‘transcendental externalism.’
10 Davidson states: “my view differs from what a lot of  people say, i.e., it certainly differs
from Burge’s idea, and it differs from Dummett’s. They both think that what a speaker
means by his words depends very heavily on how the community uses those words, whether
the speaker knows what that is or not. I think it’s a lot of  foolishness, because it has noth-
ing to do with success in communication. If  you don’t speak the way the community does
and someone figures that out, then you can communicate all day long” (Glüer, 1995, p. 81).
11 Burge writes: “Language is social in that interaction with other persons is psycholog-
ically necessary to learn language. Some philosophers have made the further claim that
there is some conceptually necessary relation between learning or having a language and
being in a community. I do not accept this view. I assume only that it is a psychologically
important fact that we cannot learn language alone” (1989, p. 175).
12 Also see “Real Patterns” in Dennett, 1998.
13 I might also add to this list of  preliminary remarks that empirical evidence available
from developmental psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, and cognitive ethology casts
serious doubt on the a priori story Davidson and Brandom tell about the relation between
communication, language, and thought. For a review of relevant findings, see Tomasello,
1999; Tomasello, 2003; Tomasello et al., 2005; and Eilan et al., 2005.
14 Brandom refers to the idea that perceptual judgment must be conceived as rationally
constrained by the perceptible facts as the ‘rational-constraint constraint’ on theories of
perception (1996, p. 245). I might note that the requirement, so characterized, seems hardly
a constraint. It is not as though responsibility to how things stand in the perceptible environ-
ment were a merely optional part of  the concept of  perception or perceptual belief. A
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theory of  perception that somehow managed to contravene the rational-constraint con-
straint would hardly deserve to be called a theory of  perception.
15 The distinction between what I am calling ‘rational responsibility’ and ‘rational
responsiveness’ is not explicit in Mind and World, but I think it is in keeping with McDowell’s
discussions of  minimal empiricism there and elsewhere. It also helps to clarify what is at
issue between McDowell, Brandom, and Davidson.
16 It is important to emphasize that McDowell – like Davidson and Brandom – would
restrict the realm or ‘logical space’ of  rational responsibility to the realm of  conceptual
representational contents, and this will be assumed throughout in discussion below. I think
that with this (quite strong) restriction in place, minimal empiricism is indeed, as McDowell
claims, indisputable. However, I do not see that there is any necessary connection between
rational responsibility and rational responsiveness if  it is permissible to extend the realm of
the former so as also to encompass nonconceptual representational contents. See Peacocke,
1998; Heck, 2000; and Heck, forthcoming B.
17 For Davidson, as for Quine, observation sentences play a special role in both the
philosophy of  language and epistemology: they are first in the order of  language acquisi-
tion – learning the use of  the simplest observation sentences is prior to learning the use of
all other sentences – and last in the order of  justification. As Davidson writes, “there is
a perfectly good sense in which certain perceptual sentences are for me epistemically
prior: they are an entering wedge into language, and perceptual sentences generally are
what connect empirical thought and talk to the world” (Kotatko et al., 2001, p. 291). It is
thus fundamental that Davidson be able to show that rejection of  the second idea com-
prised by minimal empiricism does not lead to rejection of  or inability to render intelligible
the first.
18 For a similar version of  this argument, see Davidson, 1999. One response here is that
Davidson curiously ignores Darwin. That is, insofar as the putative challenge of  determin-
ing the relevant content-determining cause of  a creature’s reactions is formulated using
such biological-functional notions as animal, stimulation, response, sensory surface, etc.,
there is an answer forthcoming from evolutionary biology (an answer, moreover, that obvi-
ates all need to bring in a second creature). Indeed, bio- or teleosemantics is premised on
this very idea (Millikan, 1993, 2004). It is also worth noting in this connection that it is an
essentially Darwinian solution that Quine ultimately provides to the epistemological pro-
blem of how ostensive learning and radical interpretation are possible. The harmony of
human intersubjective responses of  perceptual similarity, Quine suggests, “is caused by
neither interaction nor anatomical homologies. It is preestablished by natural selection,
which has favorably slanted the inductive expectations of  our forebears down the ages by
molding their innate standards of  perceptual similarity to mesh with environmental trends.
Thus it is that translators and experimenters can blithely ply their distal trades and no
questions asked” (Quine, 1999, p. 75, my emphasis). For relevant externalist considerations
involving the notion of  natural selection, see Burge, 1986. 
As Ruth Millikan would likely point out, the real culprit here is Davidson’s assumption
that, in the epistemically most basic sorts of  cases, utterances and beliefs are about
what typically causes them. (See Appendix B “What Has Natural Information to Do with
Intentional Representation?” in Millikan, 2000.) The problem is that the assumption
focuses on the conditions and physical mechanisms of  representation production. By
contrast, Millikan’s teleosemantical approach focuses on the biological mechanisms of
representation consumption. In particular, her approach focuses on what correspondences
must be assumed to obtain between representational vehicles of  a certain type and the
environment if  consumer systems are to fulfill their proper biological function. What deter-
mines the relevant cause of  a creature’s responses – and, so, its intentional content – cannot
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be settled on the basis of  the creature’s occurrent properties and dispositions considered
quite apart from their phylogenesis, i.e. the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for their
present existence. Thus, as Quine suggests in passage quoted above, it is natural selection
and not interaction between creatures that solves Davidson’s distality problem. In closing
this long note, I would also remark that were Davidson actually to formulate the problem
in purely physicalistic terms – thereby prescinding from all use of  biological-functional
notions – it would genuinely have no answer.
19 See Davidson, 1992/2001a, pp. 111–117 and Davidson, 1991/2001a, p. 209.
20 Peacocke, 2005, pp. 307–308. What distinguishes full joint attention from mere joint
attention is expressed in condition (b). In full joint attention, not only does the state of
joint attention have mutual open-ended perceptual availability to x and y, but they are also
both aware that it does. In paradigmatic cases of  successful communication, it seems clear
that full joint attention to the meaning of  an utterance is involved. So it is full joint atten-
tion that Davidson must be claiming is a necessary condition of  the existence of  language
and thought.
21 Brandom (1995) uses ‘belief*’ to refer to proto- or quasi-intentional mental states
attributable to non-linguistic animals on the basis of  their reliable differential responsive
dispositions. I am using ‘schmelief ’ here in a similar way.
22 I should mention that I think Blackburn (1981) is simply wrong on exegetical grounds
to attribute such a picture of  language to the later Wittgenstein and that what Blackburn
refers to as ‘publicity,’ i.e., communal agreement, plays no such magical role in Wittgen-
stein’s thinking about meaning and understanding. Although the point requires careful
elaboration, I would suggest that, for the later Wittgenstein, the concept of  intersubjective
agreement is no more fundamental than that of  judgment itself. See Diamond, 1989 and
Minar, 1991.
23 See, e.g. “The Emergence of  Thought” (1997), reprinted in Davidson, 2001a, and
“What Thought Requires” (2001), reprinted in Davidson, 2004.
24 By ‘individualism’ in this context Brandom intends not semantic internalism, but
simply the repudiation of  the idea that language and thought are socially constituted in the
specific manner suggested by the communication thesis.
25 One important implication of  this is that certain substitutions of  singular terms in the
claim may be warranted from the perspective of  the one attributing the claim, but not from
the perspective of  the one to whom the claim is attributed.
26 Objectivity is thus reconstrued, as Brandom says in one of  the better-known passages
from the book, “as consisting in a kind of  perspectival form, rather than in a nonperspec-
tival or cross-perspectival content. What is shared by all discursive perspectives is that
there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way of  concept application
and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is – the structure, not the content” (1994,
p. 600).
27 David Finkelstein has questioned to what extent Moran’s transparency-based model
of  self-knowledge can plausibly be extended beyond the case of  belief. See the postscript
“Deliberation and Transparency” to Finkelstein, 2003.
28 See “Making Sense of  Ourselves” and “When Frogs (and Others) Make Mistakes” in
Dennett 1987.
29 The example is from Evans, 1982, p. 225.
30 For helpful comments on early versions of  this paper, I would like to thank Bill
Bracken, Justin Bridges, Dan Dahlstrom, Juliet Floyd, Aaron Garrett, Larry Hardesty,
Richard Heck, Dasha Polzik, David Wiggins, and an audience at UC Riverside in November
2005. I am also grateful to Aidan Gray and Rachel Goodman for lively discussions of
Davidson.
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